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Institutions—the formal rules and informal 
norms that shape human interaction (North 
1991)—have the potential to influence the oper-
ation of an emissions trading system (ETS). For 
instance, preexisting economic regulation has 
been shown to affect firms’ abatement decisions 
and costs (Fowlie 2010). Transaction costs can 
also interfere with  cost-effective operation by 
reducing trading levels and increasing abate-
ment costs (Stavins 1995). As China develops a 
national ETS for carbon dioxide ( CO 2 ) covering 
multiple  energy-intensive sectors, it is import-
ant to consider how its design will interact with 
prevailing institutional features of the country’s 
economy. This paper focuses specifically on the 
role of state control of industry, one source of 
heterogeneity that will affect efforts to establish 
an ETS in China’s vast and diverse economic 
system.
The role of the state and its channels of influ-
ence over firm behavior in China differ from the 
economies where emissions trading has been 
previously introduced. This paper describes 
several key features of state influence in China, 
and examines the potential for interactions 
with the country’s proposed national ETS for 
CO 2 . The system was formally announced in 
December 2017 and is expected to develop in 
stages through 2030, supporting national goals 
to reduce  CO 2 emissions intensity by 60–65 per-
cent relative to 2005 levels over the same period.
China’s national ETS builds on almost a 
decade of  command-and-control efforts to con-
trol energy use and  CO 2 emissions, and the 
experience of seven regional pilot  CO 2 mar-
kets that launched between 2013–2015. As 
currently proposed, the national ETS would be 
“ rate-based” (firm permit allocation would be 
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adjusted based on actual  end-of-period physical 
output) and include approximately 7,000 firms 
responsible for over half (5 to 5.5 billion tons) 
of the nation’s annual  CO 2 emissions (Goulder 
et al. 2017). How rapidly to expand the system 
and to evolve the design is the subject of ongo-
ing discussion.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, it char-
acterizes the aspects of state ownership and con-
trol of industrial firms in China most likely to 
interact with the operation of an ETS. Second, 
the consequences of these interactions are ana-
lyzed and discussed. The paper concludes by 
considering which interactions may be most 
consequential for ETS operation, and some 
potential implications for program design.
I. State Control and China’s National ETS
Decades of economic reform have trans-
formed Chinese industry from almost com-
pletely state-owned to a mixture of  state-owned 
or  state-controlled, domestic private, for-
eign, joint venture, and a few remaining 
 collectively-owned firms. Many of the poorest 
performing  state-owned firms were merged into 
larger industry groups or privatized (Hsieh and 
Song 2015). This is reflected in the steady fall 
in the number of  state-owned firms through 
2012, followed by stabilization. It should be 
noted that  state-owned firms are often classified 
based on whole or majority state shareholding. 
In practice, it is state control—whether or not 
the state is designated the controlling minority 
or majority shareholder—that determines how 
firms are treated by the state. In contrast to the 
decline in  state-owned firms, the number of 
 state-controlled firms has actually increased, 
both in absolute terms and as a share of the total, 
since the early 2000s (Meyer and Wu 2014).
While  state-controlled firms differ from other 
firm types in many observed and unobserved 
ways, several attributes are worth noting. The 
government relies heavily on  state-controlled 
firms to support the achievement of  long-term 
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social and economic development targets, 
and may facilitate their access to  low-cost 
credit, resources, and markets. Leaders of 
 state-controlled firms are typically selected with 
the approval of the Communist Party, and are 
evaluated regularly on a range of economic and 
 noneconomic criteria, including measures of 
“social responsibility” (she hui ze ren) (Chen 
2013). The results of these evaluations affect 
resources or opportunities made available to 
the firm. Firms that do not meet targets may 
be denied permission to expand capacity or to 
access financing at low rates, or leaders may 
receive low scores on official cadre evaluations (Wang 2013).
 State-controlled firms vary in their level of 
government oversight, from the most local (county) to the most central (national). At the 
national level, approximately 100 of the larg-
est  state-owned firms in strategic sectors such 
as energy, mining, and aerospace are overseen 
by the  State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). Level 
of oversight strongly correlates with firm size 
and geographic footprint, and can affect gov-
ernance. For instance, production assets for 
national  state-controlled firms are spread across 
many provinces, while at the provincial, city, 
and county levels, firms are typically (but not 
always) smaller and locally focused. In China, 
there are five levels of the governing hierarchy (central, provincial, prefecture, county, and 
township), and each level of government directly 
manages the level below it, in addition to later-
ally managing any associated  state-controlled 
firms subject to their oversight. These reporting 
linkages directly affect the source and extent of 
pressure to implement environmental policy.
Several attributes of state control are pro-
posed to interact with an ETS. First, lower cap-
ital costs may affect a  state-controlled firm’s 
optimal choice of abatement. Second, there is 
a widespread expectation that  state-controlled 
firms will be more responsive to targets and 
directives to provide public goods, relative to 
private firms. Third,  state-controlled firms face 
additional punishments for failing to cooperate, 
including the withdrawal of privileges or limit-
ing the career advancement of firm leaders. The 
following paragraphs consider how each attri-
bute may interact with an ETS. This list is not 
intended to be exhaustive, but to focus on aspects 
related to the direct influence of the state over 
firm decisions. At least two additional dimen-
sions associated with  state-regulated economic 
activity—monopoly power and administrative 
pricing—may also interact with ETS function, 
and have been considered in other work (Lanz 
and Rausch 2016; Teng, Jotzo, and Wang 2017).
II. Implications for ETS Function
A. Subsidized Access to Capital
To illustrate how subsidized access to capi-
tal may interact with an ETS, consider a simple 
case that builds on Stavins (1995) on transac-
tion costs. An economy consists of two firm 
types:  state-controlled firms and private firms.1 
Firm opportunities to abate  CO 2 emissions 
require additional capital investment, which 
is subsidized for  state-controlled firms at rate 
 S( r i ) > 0 . Emissions for a firm  i equal the sum 
of unconstrained emissions  u minus the quan-
tity of emissions reduced  r , and sum to  E . The 
system allocates total emissions permits  E ̅≤ E 
with  q 0i to each firm. The number of permits 
each firm trades equals:
  t i =  u i −  r i −  q 0i .
Firms choose reductions to minimize costs 
subject to the emissions price:
  min  r i  [ c i ( r i ) − S( r i )  + p( u i −  r i −  q 0i ) ] 
 s.t.  r i ≥ 0 .
Differentiating with respect to  r i and solving 
for the permit price, we find that when the ETS 
binds, state firms abate up to the point where 
marginal cost equals the prevailing permit price 
p inclusive of the subsidy per unit abatement:
  (  ∂ c i ( r i ) _∂ r i   −  ∂ S( r i ) _∂ r i   )  − p ≥ 0 .
While private firms abate up to marginal cost 
equal to the prevailing permit price  p :
  
∂ c i ( r i ) _∂ r i  − p ≥ 0 .
1 Joint venture, foreign, and the few remaining collective 
firms are ignored for illustrative simplicity. 
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It is straightforward to see that  state-controlled 
firms would undertake a greater abatement effort 
than they would in the absence of a subsidy, as 
they face a higher effective  CO 2 price, while pri-
vate firms would abate until their marginal cost 
equaled the full  CO 2 price  p . In a system with 
a fixed cap, higher than optimal abatement by 
 state-controlled firms could crowd out any avail-
able  low-cost abatement by private firms. In this 
case, the prevailing  CO 2 price would fall, total 
cost of the system would rise, and, in a system 
with free permit allocations based on historical 
emissions, private firms would purchase more 
permits from  state-owned firms.
The above model is aimed at developing intu-
ition and oversimplifies on several important 
dimensions briefly discussed here. If abatement 
activities require both labor and capital inputs, 
an emissions price would induce  state-controlled 
firms to pursue more  capital-intensive strate-
gies, relative to private firms. The impact of a 
capital subsidy would depend on to what extent 
the prevailing  CO 2 price called forth additional 
 capital-intensive abatement in  state-controlled 
firms, compared to an unsubsidized case. Exten-
sions could also consider relevant cases closer to 
expected  real-world implementation in which an 
ETS is not a fixed cap but based on physical out-
put, in which capital subsidies interact with input 
as well as abatement decisions, and in which per-
mits are allocated according to  technology-based 
 emissions-intensity benchmarks.
B. Social Responsibility
 State-controlled firms are expected to carry 
out the priorities of the state, including  state-led 
environmental protection efforts, while private 
firms face far less pressure. Prior state environ-
mental protection initiatives focused on reducing 
local air pollution and raising energy efficiency 
have relied heavily on  state-controlled firms 
directly overseen by central and provincial gov-
ernments. A major state effort to raise the energy 
efficiency of China’s industrial sector began by 
targeting approximately 1,000 of China’s largest 
 energy-intensive firms, almost all of which were 
state controlled. When the program, known as 
the Top 1,000 Firms  Energy-Saving Program, 
was later expanded to include over 10,000 
firms, including many domestic private firms, 
 compliance dropped sharply (Karplus, Shen, and 
Zhang 2016).
Differentiated levels of social responsibility 
for  state-controlled and private firms have several 
implications for ETS function. First, enforcement 
at the firm level should not simply be assumed (Van Rooij and Lo 2010). The probability of par-
ticipation can have a large impact on cost effec-
tiveness. If a  nontrivial share of private firms does 
not participate (and report their  nonparticipation 
honestly), while all  state-controlled firms par-
ticipate fully, the set of abatement opportunities 
will be significantly constrained compared to full 
participation. Government officials will need to 
determine whether or not to require participating 
firms to deliver reductions equal to the original 
aggregate target, or to reduce the level of ambi-
tion in proportion to  nonparticipation. To the 
extent that state control increases the likelihood 
of participation, it provides a strong argument in 
favor of initiating the program in sectors with a 
higher share of cooperative firms, such as electric 
power.
Second, while social responsibility may 
encourage compliance, it may discourage 
firms from meeting their emissions reduc-
tion obligations by purchasing permits to the 
extent that they face overlapping obligations 
to reduce energy intensity,  CO 2 intensity, or 
 energy-related pollution within firm bound-
aries. One of the legacies of China’s planned 
economy that has survived the reform era is the 
use of targets in planning, which may be espe-
cially binding on  state-controlled firms. Targets 
are typically disaggregated to various levels of 
government, each of which negotiates targets 
with local firms. Within firms, responsibility for 
meeting targets is often further disaggregated 
to individual managers.  State-controlled firms 
accustomed to implementing binding targets in 
this way may be likely to focus on meeting these 
obligations first, before engaging in trading. If 
firms continue to face targets to improve their 
energy intensity or energy efficiency within firm 
boundaries as they did during the Eleventh and 
Twelfth  Five-Year Plans, many opportunities for 
improving cost effectiveness through trading 
may be foregone.
An example helps to illustrate these concerns. 
With the announcement of the ETS, the Top 
1,000/10,000 Firms  Energy-Saving Programs, 
which set  firm-specific targets for energy inten-
sity reduction, has been discontinued at the 
national level, however, elements of these pro-
grams may remain intact at the provincial level 
VOL. 108 471INSTITUTIONS AND EMISSIONS TRADING IN CHINA
and below. Meanwhile, air quality improvement 
efforts currently require absolute, rather than 
 intensity-based, reductions in  energy-related 
emissions of air pollutants, often at the level of 
individual firms. Prior research has suggested 
that these requirements may have rendered 
 energy-intensity targets  nonbinding during the 
Eleventh and Twelfth  Five-Year Plans (Nam 
et al. 2013). This situation is likely to continue, 
given that  command-and-control approaches to 
air pollution control have grown tighter since 
2013. If  state-owned firms in particular con-
tinue to follow historical norms inherent in the 
planned approach to environmental protection, 
they could  over-abate  CO 2 and thereby prevent 
the intensity cap from binding or delivering 
 cost-effective reductions.
C. Enforcement
A third distinction between  state-controlled 
and private firms involves the levers available 
to the state to enforce compliance with an ETS. 
Influence over the career paths of leaders and 
the ability to withdraw resources may be espe-
cially powerful deterrents of  noncompliance in 
 state-owned firms, as suggested by the case of the 
Beijing ETS (Karplus and Zhang 2017). In addi-
tion to participating in the system, China’s ETS 
will require accurate data on a firm’s  CO 2 emis-
sions and physical output for allocation and rec-
onciliation of reduction obligations. Here, several 
differences related to state control may matter. 
Government links to  state-controlled firms may 
facilitate easier access to data and allow for tar-
geted efforts to improve data quality. Private firms, 
by contrast, may be less cooperative. Focusing 
the attention of managers of thousands of diverse 
firms on building and maintaining credible 
emissions inventories is a formidable challenge. 
Establishing capacity to collect  CO 2 emissions 
data from all firms will require prioritizing the 
ETS among other demands on managers’ time. In 
the meantime, inattention or deliberate falsifica-
tion could undermine the system.
 State-controlled firms may not uniformly face 
stronger pressure to comply, however. Their 
 connections with various layers of state govern-
ment may create opportunities to negotiate pro-
longed grace periods and mitigate scrutiny. In 
these negotiations, resolving the tension between 
economic growth and environmental protection 
remains a major challenge. Prior studies suggest 
that  centrally-administered  state-owned firms 
may at times ignore environmental regulations, 
due to protectionism and insufficient regulatory 
capacity (Eaton and Kostka 2017). The combi-
nation of the possibility of harsher punishment 
combined with greater opportunity for regula-
tory capture exerts opposing influences on the 
compliance pressure  state-owned firms face.
III. Implications for China’s National ETS
China’s national  CO 2 ETS is expected to 
launch in stages over the next several years. 
Current plans suggest that electric power will 
be the first sector covered, followed by cement 
and aluminum, before expanding to other sec-
tors. These sectors differ sharply in the relative 
importance of  state-controlled firms. The power 
sector has a very high share of  state-owned firms (around 60 percent in 2016), while cement has 
only a few percent. While designations of state 
control and  output-weighted measures suggest 
higher shares in both sectors, the gap persists 
and may be important for managing expecta-
tions of ETS performance. The analysis above 
leads to several recommendations for system 
design, taking into consideration China’s unique 
institutional landscape.
First, capital subsidies for SOEs have the poten-
tial to reduce the efficiency and alter the distribu-
tional impacts of an ETS in China, but if targets 
bind, the system is still expected to reduce emis-
sions. To the extent that the system discourages 
investment in  energy-intensive productive capi-
tal and shifts it toward abatement capital, it may 
help to address overcapacity in  energy-intensive 
industries. However, it is generally not advisable 
to counter one distortion with another. Removing 
the capital subsidy may have a similar effect on 
reducing energy intensity. Comparing this to the 
impact of introducing a  CO 2 price in the subsi-
dy’s presence would be a worthwhile simulation 
exercise. However, a subsidy reduction would 
increase costs to  state-controlled firms, which 
may be politically untenable.
Second, an unwillingness of firms to par-
ticipate in emissions reduction or trading, for 
instance, because they face overlapping or 
redundant reduction obligations, or because they 
face differential enforcement pressure, poses a 
more serious challenge for emissions trading in 
China. Replacing old systems and practices with 
emissions trading will a be  long-term effort, 
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requiring both greater awareness at the firm 
level and increasing policy coordination at the 
national level. One recommendation is to focus 
on separately developing an ETS with national 
coverage within individual sectors that vary in 
their degree of market orientation, e.g., in terms 
of ownership, market concentration, price for-
mation, and government intervention. The elec-
tric power sector is heavily state controlled and 
subject to administrative pricing, suggesting a 
more constrained role for a market mechanism 
in reducing the cost of emissions reductions. 
Other sectors, such as cement and aluminum, 
have a much higher degree of private ownership, 
lower market concentration, and no administra-
tive pricing in product markets.
The analysis here points to a trade-off at 
the core of ETS design in China: the firms 
most likely to comply may operate in the least 
 market-oriented settings. To establish an inte-
grated and  cost-effective market, it will be import-
ant to address potential barriers to participation 
and compliance in the domestic private sector, 
while increasingly exposing  state-controlled 
firms to market forces. Arguably, achieving the 
first goal will be more important to ETS effec-
tiveness, given the scale of China’s private sector. 
However, starting with the electric power sector, 
with its high share of  state-controlled firms, may 
be a promising way to demonstrate program 
effectiveness, even if limited trading occurs. 
Given the unprecedented size and ambition 
inherent in any effort to build a comprehensive 
ETS in China, a gradual, adaptive approach to 
learning what works best in the country’s unique 
institutional environment may hold the greatest 
promise for success in the long term.
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